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RUNNING ON EMPTY:  THE PROBLEM WITH 
POLITICIANS AND STEALING (MUSIC) 
Maral Vahdani* 
 
This Comment explores the legal issues arising from unauthorized use 
of musical compositions during political campaigns and rallies.  Focusing 
on John McCain’s use of Jackson Brown’s song “Running on Empty” dur-
ing his political campaign, the article examines why such uses are prob-
lematic and proposes remedies for preventing future unauthorized use. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Rock and Roll Hall of Fame musician Jackson Browne’s website de-
scribes him as an artist who has “defined a genre of songwriting charged 
with honesty, emotion and personal politics.”1  In a section of Browne’s 
website called “Readings,” he offers a glimpse of what those personal poli-
tics entail:  current articles, book reviews, and essays on topics ranging 
from nuclear reactors to the United States’ torture of inmates at Guan-
tanamo Bay.2 
Given Browne’s well known liberal leanings,3 it seems especially trou-
blesome that Republican John McCain, then in his bid for the presidency, 
 
* J.D., Chapman University School of Law, 2011; B.A., University of California, Santa 
Barbara, 2005.  The author would like to thank Professor Steven G. Krone for his editing, pa-
tience, and infinite knowledge on all things entertainment law.  The author would also like to 
thank Professor John Tehranian for his endless support, Nick, Sam, and Ashkan for teaching her 
everything she knows, and lastly, for everything else, she would like to thank her Mother, Golriz, 
Yasamine, and Travis. 
1. Biography of Jackson Browne, JACKSONBROWNE.COM, http://jacksonbrowne.com/bio 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2012). 
2. Readings, JACKSONBROWNE.COM, http://jacksonbrowne.com/readings (last visited Mar. 
15, 2012). 
3. See Geoff Boucher, Jackson Browne Sues John McCain over Song Use, L.A. TIMES TOP 
OF THE TICKET (Aug. 14, 2008, 12:40 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2008/08/jackson-browne.html (“Browne . . . gave 
Obama $2,000 shortly after he won his Senate seat in 2004 and another $2,300 in March.  
Browne also has given about $5,500 to MoveOn.org, $5,266 to Rep. Lois Capps of Santa Bar-
bara.  And he’s sent $1,000 to Al Franken, the Democratic Senate candidate in Minnesota, $500 
to Ned Lamont for his 2006 run for Joe Lieberman‘s Senate seat in Connecticut.”). 
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would use Browne’s song “Running on Empty” in a commercial criticizing 
his opponent Barack Obama.4  Browne is not only a Democrat, but has also 
been a public voice of support for Obama.5  While the unauthorized use of 
copyrighted music in political campaigns is nothing new,6 the McCain cam-
paign’s use of copyrighted music created considerably more controversy than 
similar uses have in previous campaigns.7  In fact, at least ten artists, includ-
ing Browne, demanded that McCain stop using their music without permis-
sion during his 2008 campaign.8 
On August 14, 2008, Browne sued McCain alleging copyright in-
fringement.9  The suit centered on McCain’s use of Browne’s song “Run-
ning on Empty” in a Republican Party campaign commercial attacking 
Obama.10  During the commercial, the instrumental introduction of 
Browne’s composition begins playing as the screen displays the words 
“What’s that Obama plan again?” and continues to play throughout the du-
ration of the commercial.11 
In his suit, Browne alleged not only copyright infringement, but also 
vicarious copyright infringement, violation of the Lanham Act for false 
 
4. Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (“In anticipation of 
then-Democratic Presidential candidate Barack Obama’s visit to Ohio the week of August 4, 
2008, [the Ohio Republican Party], acting as an agent for the [the Republican National Commit-
tee] and Senator McCain, created a web video to criticize and comment on Barack Obama’s en-
ergy policy and his suggestion that the country could conserve gasoline by keeping their automo-
bile tires inflated to the proper pressure (the ‘Commercial’).  During the Commercial, a sound 
recording of Browne performing the Composition, ‘Running on Empty,’ plays in the back-
ground.”). 
5.  Id. at 1075. 
6. See David C. Johnston, Note, The Singer Did Not Approve This Message:  Analyzing the 
Unauthorized Use of Copyrighted Music in Political Advertisements in Jackson Browne v. John 
McCain?, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 688–90 (2010) (demonstrating that in each recent 
presidential election, at least one campaign has been asked to cease unauthorized public perform-
ances of an artist’s music, including Bob Dole in 1996 (“Dole Man,” modifying the lyrics of 
“Soul Man” by Isaac Hayes and David Porter); George W. Bush in 2000 (“Brand New Day” by 
Sting); Bush again in 2004 (“Still the One” by Orleans); and Mike Huckabee in 2008 (“More 
Than a Feeling” by Boston). With respect to McCain specifically, at least ten artists have re-
quested or demanded that he stop unauthorized public performances of their music, including 
Browne; Heart (“Barracuda”); John Cougar Mellencamp (“Our Country” and “Pink Houses”); 
Van Halen (“Right Now”); Foo Fighters (“My Hero”); Frankie Valli (“Can’t Take My Eyes Off 
of You”); ABBA (“Take a Chance on Me”); Bon Jovi (“Who Says You Can’t Go Home?”), 28 
Survivor (“Eye of the Tiger”); and the owner of the rights to “Gonna Fly Now,” the trumpet an-
them from the film Rocky.). 
7. Id. at 689–90. 
8. Id. at 689. 
9. Id. at 687. 
10. Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1075. 
11. Id. at 1076. 
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association or endorsement, and violation of the right of publicity, which is 
a cause of action stemming from California common law.12  The claims 
survived a motion for summary judgment brought by McCain and the Re-
publican National Committee (“RNC”);13 the parties later settled outside of 
court for an undisclosed sum.14  While Browne’s immediate problem was 
solved, the larger legal issues of such unauthorized use have yet to be an-
swered definitively by the courts.15 
Artists like Browne are not without recourse, but their options for 
preventing unauthorized use are currently problematic.  This Comment will 
address two claims an artist can bring in order to protect his or her rights 
and the likelihood of success of these claims based on existing case law.  
Part II discusses copyright and trademark protection, and the potential in-
adequacies of each.  Part III proposes a solution to these problems, result-
ing in the allowance of greater protection to artists, while still maintaining 
the intended goals of copyright and trademark law. 
II.  THE COPYRIGHT ACT AND TRADEMARK PROTECTION 
A.  The Copyright Act and Fair Use 
Congress enacted the U.S. Copyright Act16 under its Constitutional 
authority to protect authors’ writings.17  Today, copyright protection ex-
tends to architectural design, computer software, graphic arts, motion pic-
tures, and sound recordings.18  Copyright protection of music applies to 
both the composition itself as well as to the recording of the song.19  Pur-
suant to the Copyright Act, a copyright owner has the “exclusive” right to 
reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies, perform 
the work publicly, and perform the work by means of a digital audio 
transmission.20  While a creator’s rights require protection, the Copyright 
 
12. Id. at 1077. 
13. Id. at 1081. 
14. Johnston, supra note 6, at 690. 
15. Id. at 690–91. 
16. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2006). 
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
19. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
20. Id. 
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Act also recognizes the public interest in promoting creativity.21  In order 
to achieve the Constitution’s goal of promoting the “Progress of Science 
and useful Arts,”22 the Copyright Act balances the right of an author to 
benefit from his or her work with the public’s need to use that work to 
create new material.23 
By applying the “fair use” doctrine, Congress and the Judiciary bal-
ance the public interest in using a work with the copyright owner’s right to 
exclusivity in his or her original creative works.24  In applying the fair use 
exception, courts developed a test,25 now incorporated into the statute, de-
signed to ensure the competing interests are weighed properly.26  The de-
finitive Supreme Court case on the matter is Campbell v. Acuff-Rose.27  Us-
ing the balancing test laid out in the case,28 courts evaluate the following 
four factors:  (1) the purpose of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the work.29 
1.  The First Fair Use Factor:  Purpose and Character of Use 
The first factor in the fair use analysis is “the purpose and character of 
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-
profit educational purposes.”30  In Campbell, the respondent, Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., filed suit against petitioners, the members of the rap music 
group 2 Live Crew and its record company, claiming that 2 Live Crew’s 
 
21. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. 
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)). 
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
23. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575. 
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair 
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by 
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright.”). 
25. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
26. See id. at 576–77. 
27. Id. at 569. 
28. Id. at 577. 
29. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
30. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 508 F. 
Supp. 854, 860 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding unfair use where defendants copied protected work 
solely for their own financial gain when American Heritage Products unlawfully manufactured 
and sold plastic busts of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and used words from his copyrighted 
speeches on its advertisements). 
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song, “Pretty Woman,” infringed upon Acuff-Rose’s copyright in Roy Or-
bison’s rock ballad, “Oh, Pretty Woman.”31  The rap group defended on the 
ground that its version of the song was a parody entitled to fair use 
protection under the Copyright Act.32  The District Court granted summary 
judgment for 2 Live Crew, holding that its song was a parody that made 
fair use of the original.33 
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the com-
mercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair under the first 
of the four factors relevant under section 107; “that, by taking the heart of 
the original and making it the heart of a new work, 2 Live Crew had, quali-
tatively, taken too much” under the third section 107 factor; and that mar-
ket harm, for purposes of the fourth section 107 factor, had been estab-
lished by a presumption attaching to commercial uses.34   
The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the commercial nature of 
the song did not render a use presumptively unfair.35  Instead, a parody’s 
commercial character is only one element that should be weighed in a fair 
use inquiry.36  The Court in Campbell also analyzed the transformative value 
of the work in question, holding that parody “can provide social benefit, by 
shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, creating a new one.”37 
Here, McCain’s use of Browne’s music cannot be considered trans-
formative, as he did not do anything new with Browne’s song.38  Instead, 
McCain used Browne’s actual composition.39  Here, McCain’s use was not 
novel nor did it provide any social benefit, and it may have actually harmed 
Browne’s artistic integrity.40  McCain’s use of Browne’s work was not of 
the type Congress intended to be included in the protection it laid out for 
new creative works that draw from preexisting ones.  Instead, McCain’s 
conduct is the very type of copyright infringement the Copyright Act seeks 
to prohibit. 
 
31. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 573. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 574. 
35. Id. at 594. 
36. Id. at 572; see also Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(holding that a photo similar to that of a famed photographer was a parody that did not result in 
market harm and accordingly fell under fair use). 
37. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. 
38. See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1076 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
39. See generally id. at 1076–77. 
40. See supra Part I. 
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While McCain’s use of Browne’s song and voice is not transforma-
tive, this fact alone is not sufficient to defeat McCain’s fair use argu-
ment.  The first factor of the fair use analysis also focuses on the com-
mercial nature of the use.41  In this portion of the analysis, courts must 
determine whether a political campaign advertisement is considered 
commercial.42  Courts that have addressed this question have unani-
mously agreed that they are not.43  Nonetheless, Browne need not prove 
that McCain’s use of his song was “commercial” in order for Browne to 
prevail.  While political speech may be presumptively non-commercial, 
the Browne court specifically stated, “copyright claims based on use of a 
copyrighted work in a political campaign are not barred, as a matter of 
law, under the fair use doctrine.”44 
2.  The Second Fair Use Factor:  The Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
The nature of the potentially infringing use and whether it serves the 
public interest affects the level of protection courts will afford the copy-
righted work.45  When analyzing this second factor, courts must determine 
whether greater access to the work “would serve the public interest in the 
free dissemination of information.”46  McCain likely used Browne’s song 
because it is well known and its lyrics are relevant to the point he was try-
ing to make about Obama’s energy plan.  However, using the song to criti-
cize Obama is not the same thing as altering the song itself for the purposes 
of parody, which the Supreme Court has recognized as a fair use.47  Again, 
the song was not altered in any way— instead, a recording of the original 
musical composition was simply played throughout the commercial. 
 
41. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. 
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
43. See MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00-CV-6068 (GBD), 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *28–29 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004) (holding that defendant’s “use 
of plaintiff’s trademarks is not commercial, but instead political in nature and that, therefore, it is 
exempted from coverage by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act”); Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. 
Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 697 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (“[I]t is arguable whether [the candidate’s] 
speech proposes a commercial transaction at all.”); Keep Thomson Governor Comm. v. Citizens 
for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957, 958 (D.N.H. 1978) (holding that defendant’s use “of a por-
tion of the plaintiff’s political advertisement is clearly part of a political campaign message [and 
therefore] noncommercial in nature”). 
44. Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1078 n.2. 
45. See Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966). 
46. See id. 
47. See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569. 
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3.  The Third Fair Use Factor:  Extent of the Use of the Protected Work 
The third factor courts analyze under the fair use doctrine considers 
the extent to which the work was used.48  Courts consider “how much of 
the copyrighted work was taken and whether that portion was an essential 
element of the plaintiff’s work.”49  Here, at least twenty seconds of the 
song “Running on Empty,” including the chorus, were included in a com-
mercial that is approximately one minute and twenty seconds long.50  While 
the McCain commercial used a little more than ten percent of Browne’s to-
tal composition,51 the parts of the song used were substantial.  Specifically, 
using the chorus of the song, which also includes the song’s title, is more 
substantial than using, for example, just an instrumental portion.52  
McCain’s use of Browne’s chorus provides a greater likelihood that the 
song will be recognized by anyone who is familiar with Browne’s work.53 
4.  The Fourth Fair Use Factor:   
Impact on Potential Value of the Protected Work 
The fourth factor in the fair use analysis requires courts to consider 
not only market harm the alleged infringer has already caused, but also the 
future harm.54  This factor weighs most heavily in support of Browne and 
other artists in similar situations.  McCain’s use of “Running on Empty” 
without permission resulted in a pecuniary loss equivalent to what it would 
have cost to license the song’s use.55  While a single instance of copyright 
infringement in this case would not yield substantial losses, the losses 
would be significant if this type of infringement were to continue.  Fur-
thermore, if Browne’s music is routinely used to spread a political message 
that is out of line with the artist’s own political beliefs, it is likely his target 
audience may lose interest in his original works. 
 
48. See Hustler Magazine Inc. v. Moral Majority, 606 F. Supp. 1526, 1537 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
49. Id. 
50. Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1076. 
51.  Id. at 1075–76 (stating the original song is 296 seconds.  Because the song played from 
the fifty second mark to the end of the commercial, the commercial uses approximately ten per-
cent of Browne’s song.). 
52. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587–88. 
53. See supra Part I (discussing Browne’s popularity as a political artist). 
54. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. 
55. Johnston, supra note 6, at 702. 
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B.  Trademark Law and the Lanham Act 
Found in Title 15 of the U.S. Code, the Lanham Act (“Act”) contains 
the federal statutes governing trademark law in the United States.56  The 
primary purpose of trademark protection is to avoid public confusion “as to 
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another per-
son, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, serv-
ices, or commercial activities by another person.”57  Pursuant to this pri-
mary goal, whether a trademark has been infringed depends on whether this 
sort of consumer confusion is likely.58  The Act was amended in 1996 to 
include the Trademark Dilution Act.59  This addition to the Lanham Act 
protects against dilution, defined as the use of a trademark by someone 
other than its owner resulting in impairment of the mark’s distinctiveness.60  
Dilution can be found through “blurring,” the process through which an es-
tablished trademark is whittled away “through its unauthorized use by oth-
ers upon dissimilar products”61 or “tarnishment,” which occurs “when the 
plaintiff’s trademark is linked to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed 
in an unwholesome or unsavory context.”62 
1.  Is It “Commercial”? 
The Lanham Act, both in section 43(a) and in section 43(c), requires a 
use “in commerce.”63  Thus, establishing that a political use is commercial 
is essential to showing that an artist can recover on a trademark claim.  In 
his trademark infringement defense, McCain argued that his use of 
Browne’s song was political, and thus not commercial.64  Addressing 
McCain’s argument that the Lanham Act does not apply to political speech, 
the District Court pointed out case law to the contrary stating, “the Lanham 
Act applies to noncommercial (i.e., political) and commercial speech.”65  In 
support of this proposition, the court cited the cases United We Stand 
 
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2010). 
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
62. Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994). 
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
64. Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. 
65. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York, Inc.66 and MGM-
Pathe Communications Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol.67 
2.  Is It “In Commerce”? 
The court next addressed McCain’s contention that the statute’s use of 
the phrase “in commerce” required that “the defendant actually used the 
mark in commerce.”68  Citing United We Stand, the court explained, “the 
Act’s reference to use ‘in commerce’ actually ‘reflects Congress’s intent to 
legislate to the limits of its authority under the Commerce Clause’ to regu-
late interstate commerce.”69  The court’s logic is that diminishing the plain-
tiff’s ability to use the mark is sufficient to establish an effect on interstate 
commerce, and could accordingly satisfy the “in commerce” requirement.70  
The scope of the commerce requirement, the court explained, is broad.71 
 
66. United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d 
Cir. 1997).  Here, the mark at issue was “United We Stand America,” a service mark initially 
used by Ross Perot’s 1992 presidential campaign committee.  Id. at 88.  Perot’s committee estab-
lished the United Corporation and assigned its right to the words “United We Stand America” to 
the plaintiff, the current owner of the mark, in 1992.  Id.  The trademark became effective in 
1994.  Id.  Defendant, who had previously worked with the campaign, used the mark for his own 
political activities once he left the campaign.  Id.  The Court held defendant’s political activities 
were “services” “in commerce.”  Id. at 89–93. 
67. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (issuing an injunction against the defendant-gay activist organization, finding that the 
plaintiff-film company demonstrated a likelihood of confusion where its trademarked name—“the 
Pink Panther”—was strong and distinctive, that there was a high degree of similarity between the 
marks, and that a lack of consumer sophistication existed.  Notably, the Court looked to the non-
political nature of the work in question to decide that the use by a political group made the in-
fringement more detrimental to the trademark owner.  The Court explained, “[plaintiff] MGM has 
developed this mark to suggest ‘carefree, comedic, non-political fun.’”  Accordingly, the defen-
dant’s “use of this very distinctive and famous name will raise questions in the minds of the pub-
lic, as to whether the promoters of the comic Pink Panther are engaged in sponsoring the Patrol’s 
cause and efforts.”  This type of confusion, the court held, is what “trademark laws are designed 
to avoid.”). 
68. Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. 
69. Id. (quoting United We Stand Am., Inc., 128 F.3d 86 at 92); U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 
(“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”). 
70. Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1079. 
71. Id. (relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Steel v. Bulova Watch Co. Inc., 344 
U.S. 280, 286–287 (1952), in which the Court explained, “[i]n the light of the broad jurisdic-
tional grant in the Lanham Act, we deem its scope to encompass petitioner’s activities here.  His 
operations and their effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a foreign nation.  
He bought component parts of his wares in the United States, and spurious ‘Bulovas’ filtered 
through the Mexican border into this country; his competing goods could well reflect adversely 
on Bulova Watch Company’s trade reputation in markets cultivated by advertising here as well 
as abroad.  Under similar factual circumstances, courts of the United States have awarded relief 
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3.  The Federal Trademark Dilution Act 
As discussed, under federal law, dilution can be found through “blur-
ring,”72 or “tarnishment.”73  Artists like Browne, who are commonly asso-
ciated with a certain viewpoint, can raise a strong argument for tarnishment 
under the Dilution Act.  Again, the use must be “commercial” and “in 
commerce.”74  As referenced, Browne is an artist who has taken a specific 
political stance, in support of Obama, and for that reason sought association 
with Obama’s campaign.75  Accordingly, McCain’s commercial “tar-
nished” Browne’s image as a Democrat and Obama-supporter in a way that 
was likely to cause dilution to Browne’s name. 
The risk to Browne’s image is clear.  The general public who saw 
Browne performing one week at an Obama rally and next heard Browne’s 
music in a television commercial aired by Obama’s opponent may have 
easily believed Browne was willing to lend his voice, and lyrics, to whom-
ever would pay him.  This perception may not matter for an artist who 
freely endorses a wide variety of products and services.  For example, 
Grammy winning pop artist Beyoncé is well known for her endorsement 
deals ranging from bottled water to video game consoles.76  If a consumer 
sees an artist such as Beyoncé drinking Coca-Cola in an advertisement one 
week and two weeks later promoting Pepsi, they will simply assume her 
new endorsement contract is with Pepsi.  These conflicting endorsements 
may harm the product, in this case Coca-Cola, but it does not necessarily 
harm Beyoncé personally.77  The problem is greater for an artist like 
Browne, however, who, though well known, is not associated with various 
 
to registered trademark owners, even prior to the advent of the broadened commerce provisions 
of the Lanham Act.”). 
72. See Mead Data Cent., Inc., 875 F.2d at 1031. 
73. See id. 
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
75. See Barack Obama for President, JACKSONBROWNE.COM, 
http://www.jacksonbrowne.com/readings/barack-obama-president (last visited Mar. 15, 2012). 
76. See Lacy Rose, The Best Paid Celebs Under Thirty, FORBES.COM (July 6, 2009), 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/02/beyonce-knowles-earnings-business-entertainment-young-
stars.html (“The 27-year-old songstress turned actress turned global brand found time to release a 
double album (I Am . . . Sasha Fierce), star in two films (Cadillac Records and Obsessed), per-
form at both the Academy Awards and a presidential inaugural ball and embark on a 110-date 
international tour.  She also added Crystal Geyser and Nintendo DSi to a lengthy list of endorse-
ment deals that already included American Express.”). 
77. See Weil, S.A. v. Theron, 585 F. Supp. 2d 473 (S.D.N.Y 2008). 
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commercial products.78  Browne’s name is infrequently associated with en-
dorsements,79 and when it is, such as in the context of the McCain com-
mercial, the public is more likely to assume he supports that endorsement.  
Beyond the possibility of viewing Browne as someone willing to sell his 
work to the highest bidder, the public is also likely to infer, to Browne’s 
detriment, that he has now shifted sides and no longer supports Obama.  
Both possibilities tarnish Browne’s image. 
III.  PROPOSAL 
Escaping the restrictions imposed by copyright and trademark law by 
claiming non-commercial use provides political figures with too much 
leeway to use the compositions of any musician or artist of their choosing.  
While use of a creative work without permission may be troublesome in 
any context, it is particularly problematic in the political context, where an 
artist profits not only from his or her musical compositions, but also from 
the image he or she creates.80  When an artist’s music is associated in a way 
that contradicts his or her image, the artist is harmed not only financially, 
but also in an intangible sense.81  The solution is to prevent political figures 
from using an artist’s work by taking the commercial definition of the 
Trademark Act and applying it to copyright law.  It is also essential to rec-
ognize that First Amendment protection is for political speech—not speech 
made by politicians.82 
A.  Copyright Law 
To ensure that copyright law adequately protects the works of artists 
who fear their integrity may be compromised, the first proposal concerns the 
fair use defense.  Under the first fair use factor, the purpose and character of 
use, courts currently consider both whether the work is transformative and 
whether it is commercial.83  Transformative works undoubtedly deserve the 
highest protection, as they embody the very sort of creativity Congress 
sought to encourage in recognizing the fair use defense.84  However, regard-
 
78. Brian Baxter, Election 2008:  Jackson Browne is No Fan of John McCain, THE AM 
LAW DAILY (Oct. 7, 2008, 5:40 PM), 
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2008/10/jackson-browne.html. 
79. See id. 
80. See generally Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003). 
81. See generally id. 
82. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
83. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994). 
84. See id. at 579. 
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less of the purpose and character of the use, whether the use is commercial 
deserves more attention and, accordingly, should be more clearly defined by 
the courts.  Based on existing law, political speech is currently deemed non-
commercial for copyright purposes, yet not all political speech is actually 
non-commercial.85  When a politician uses popular copyrighted music in an 
advertisement intended to raise money, surely he is soliciting the public and 
engaging in commerce.86  The Browne court specifically stated, “copyright 
claims based on use of a copyrighted work in a political campaign are not 
barred, as a matter of law, under the fair use doctrine.”87  This judicial stance 
is important, but carries little weight when discussed only at the summary 
judgment stage of a case that never went to trial.88  By defining what 
qualifies as “commercial” within the statute, further confusion can be 
avoided and future political, commercial uses prevented. 
B.  Trademark Law 
In addressing McCain’s claim that his speech was political and thus not 
commercial, the court agreed that political speech is non-commercial but ac-
knowledged that non-commercial speech can fall under the Lanham Act.89  
This stance, although problematic, can be easily remedied.  The Lanham Act 
explicitly states that it applies only to commercial uses in commerce.90  In-
stead of avoiding that requirement, case law must recognize that while all 
non-commercial use can escape the Lanham Act, some types of political 
speech are commercial.  As discussed above, when a politician, or any other 
individual, uses the channels of commerce to advertise and solicit donations, 
he or she is entering into the stream of commerce in order to derive commer-
cial benefit.91  McCain may be a politician, but his commercial was about 
raising money, rather than just about expressing his political ideas. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Unauthorized use of an artist’s work is always problematic, especially 
when it can affect not only record sales, but also an artist’s credibility and 
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integrity.  The Jackson Browne case is only one recent example of the legal 
issues raised when politicians use music without permission.92  While 
Browne’s case did not make it far in litigation before a settlement was 
reached, it is only a matter of time before a court will have to address these 
issues once again. 
By more clearly defining the terms of the fair use exception to the 
Copyright Act and the scope of the Lanham Act, courts can clarify the re-
sponsibilities of parties on both sides and help deter further infringement.  
Specifically, artists can gain greater protection by legal recognition that po-
litical speech can be commercial, and that such commercial uses are against 
the Constitution’s original goals of balancing the artists’ rights against the 
rights of the public. 
 
 
92. See Johnston, supra note 6, at 688; see also David Itzkoff, Politician Apologized to Don 
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